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In Dennis v. United States,' Justice Robert Jackson noted that lawmaking
in his generation involved never-ending quests for a legal formula that would
protect America against a communist revolution.2 Jackson was writing
primarily about the Smith Act,3 but his remark had much broader application.
In the years after World War II, the Supreme Court continually reformulated
constitutional doctrine in ways designed to prevent a totalitarian regime,
communist or otherwise, from arising in the United States. Sometimes, as in
Dennis, antitotalitarianism4 appeared on the face of judicial doctrine. In a
more subtle way, the desire to articulate principles that distinguished America
from the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany contributed to a long line of liberal
Supreme Court decisions from the Second World War through the Warren era.
Those decisions revolutionized the law of free expression,5 equal protection,"
police procedures,7 and personal privacy.8 But to credit antitotalitarianism
with helping to remake constitutional case law is still to underestimate its
influence. The problem of totalitarianism gave birth to major themes in modern
academic constitutional theory. Indeed, constitutional thought still operates
within the framework defined by opposition to Nazism and communism.
I. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
2. See id. at 561 (Jackson, J., concurring).
3. Smith Act, ch. 645, §§ 2-3, 54 Stat. 671 (1940) (current %crsion at 18 USC § 2385 u1994),
(criminalizing conspiracy to overthrow government or advocac) of doctines calling for such o%cnhro)
4. "Antitotalitarianism" in this Note simply means opposition to. revulsion at. and the desirc to bc
meaningfully different from, the two totalitarianisms that mid-tweniieth century Amencans knes%. naincl).
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Those two regimes were unlike each other in man) a but manN
American intellectuals by the 1930s had come to appreciate substantial similantics bct,,ccn them as scl
Accordingly, they perceived "totalitarianism" as a single phenomenon See PETER No% ICK. THAT NOBLE
DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSIO% 281 (1988). Eov. ARD
A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURAuLSM AD TIMe PROBLEt OF
VALUE 135-38 (1973); see also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.. THE VITAL CE.-rER 143-45 t1949) See
generally HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (2d ed. 1968)
5. See, e.g., West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U S. 624 (1943)
6. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ.. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Er patte Mitsu)e Endo. 323 U S 283
(1944).
7. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Gideon % wainwnght. 372 U S 335 1963)
8. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
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Antitotalitarianism lies just below the surface of the leading modern theories
of constitutional law, coloring the work of scholars like John Hart Ely and
Bruce Ackerman. The quest for an antitotalitarian formula marks not just
judicial doctrine but academic constitutional thought as well. Theorists know
that the ability to prevent the rise of a Nazi- or Soviet-style regime has become
the implicit final test of any constitutional theory, and they struggle, just as
Jackson's Court struggled, to find a formula adequate to the task.
Understanding the aims and the limits of modern constitutional thought,
academic as well as judicial, thus requires understanding the influence of
antitotalitarianism.
Existing scholarship has tended to underestimate the role of
antitotalitarianism in postwar judicial doctrine and to ignore the influence of
antitotalitarianism on contemporary constitutional theorists. To be sure, some
scholars have noted the influence of antitotalitarianism on specific
constitutional doctrines such as equal protection 9 and the right of privacy.'0
These accounts, however, are concerned with particular doctrines rather than
with the development of constitutional thinking as a whole. Scholars who have
tried to account for postwar constitutional development more broadly have
discussed a range of explanatory factors other than antitotalitarianism: the New
Deal," the Cold War,'2 the Great Society,
3 the civil rights movement, 4
the women's movement, 5 public opposition to the war in Vietnam, 6 and
9. See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Brown's Reflection, 103 YALE L.J. 1483, 1487-88 (1994) (suggesting that
anti-Nazism influenced Justice Jackson's position on racial desegregation); Michael J. Klarman, Brown,
Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 14, 24-25 (1994) (claiming that general
revulsion at Nazism and at associated theories of racial superiority informed decision to end school
segregation).
10. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 784-804 (1989) (arguing that
right of privacy announced in Griswold is intimately linked to problem of totalitarianism and should be
understood as defense against state-enforced conformity).
II. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). Ackerman's theory is
discussed in more detail infra Section III.A. See also Sanford Levinson, in ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, TIlE
AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 174-205 (chs. 8-9) (Sanford Levinson ed., 2d ed. 1994) (arguing that activist
welfare state entails increased regulation of private life, thus raising importance of clarifying individual
rights against state).
12. Several scholars have interpreted Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). as partly
motivated by international realpolitik: Racial segregation did little to improve America's image with fence-
sitting nations in Africa and Asia, and the Soviet Union exploited this American weakness. See, e.g.,
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 518, 524-25 (1980); Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV.
61,62-63 (1988); Constance Baker Motley, The Historical Setting of Brown and Its Impact on the Supreme
Court's Decision, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 9, 9 (1992).
13. See Mark Tushnet, Preface to THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE
at ix-x (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993).
14. See generally TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954-63
(1988) (describing impact of civil rights movement on American political climate); JACK GREENBERG,
CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION (1994) (describing impact of civil rights litigation on constitutional law).
15. See Levinson, supra note I1, at 164-65.
16. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
IN AMERICA 135-65 (1991) (describing impact of Pentagon Papers controversy); Arnold S. Rice, Editor's
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the adoption by the Supreme Court of a theory of pure procedural
democracy. 7 Those forces certainly did influence constitutional doctrine
between World War II and the 1960s, but the influence of antitotalitarianism
was at least as important.
The influence of antitotalitarianism on academic constitutional theory has
been even more neglected. The leading work on American intellectual reaction
to totalitarianism is Edward Purcell's The Crisis of Democratic Theory,I3 in
which Purcell argued that many American legal scholars who had once been
relativists embraced foundational moral theories in the 1930s and 1940s
because the confrontation with Nazism made relativism less attractive. 9
Purcell's account ended with the 1960s, but the influence of totalitarianism did
not. As this Note shows, the problem of totalitarianism significantly influenced
two of the most important contributions to recent constitutional theory, John
Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust20 and Bruce Ackerman's We the People:
Foundations.2' Each of these books exhibits internal tensions which, I
suggest, are best viewed in the context of the antitotalitarian influence.
Democracy and Distrust argues for a purely procedural approach to
judicial review. Judges, Ely argues, should not make substantive choices on
issues of values or policy. Instead, they should interpret the Constitution so as
to regulate the processes of representative democracy, making sure that the
channels of political change are open and functioning properly.L2 Most of
Democracy and Distrust is dedicated to this argument. Toward the end of the
book, however, Ely argues that the Constitution must grant special protections
to minority groups.23 Several commentators have noted that this prescription
does violence to the book's major claim that the Constitution should be
interpreted in ways that avoid making judgments on substantive policy
issues.24 What those commentators have left unasked, however, is why Ely
undercuts his general theory in this way. I suggest that what forces Ely to
qualify his theory is the problem of totalitarianism. Without the special
provision for minority rights, Ely's procedural constitutionalism could not
block a Nazi-style regime from arising in America. Because antitotalitarianism
is implicitly required of any constitutional theory, Ely adds an antitotalitarian
Foreword to 8 THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE: THE WARREN COURT. 1953-1969. at ix-x
(Arnold S. Rice ed., 1987).
17. See JOHN HART ELY. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL RilE"%, (1980) Ely's
theory is discussed infra Section III.B.
18. PURCELL, supra note 4.
19. See id. at 159-79; see also infra Subsection L.A I
20. ELY, supra note 17.
21. ACKERMAN, supra note II.
22. See ELY, supra note 17, at 73-134.
23. See id. at 135-80.
24. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The PuzJltng Persistence of Process-Based Consttutiunal Theories.
89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 (1980); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town The Contnbutwiu of John
Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory 89 YALE L.J. 1037. 1045 (1980)
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chapter to his book, even though that chapter is in great tension with the heart
of his proceduralist theory.
We the People also operates within an antitotalitarian framework. In that
book, Ackerman offers a "dualist" theory of popular sovereignty, arguing that
the People have broad authority to amend the Constitution both within and
without the formal amending procedures of Article V.25 The dualist theory is
presented not as a prescriptive argument for how American constitutionalism
should operate but as an interpretive description of how American
constitutionalism has actually functioned. After elaborating that descriptive
interpretation, Ackerman offers a prescriptive constitutional vision that
explicitly rejects the dualist system that We the People describes. Having
argued that the people have broad, inherent power to amend the Constitution,
he proposes that certain parts of the Constitution be made unamendable by any
means, formal or otherwise. 26 In parallel to the question of why Ely undercuts
the descriptive theory of Democracy and Distrust, I ask why Ackerman
disavows the descriptive theory that he offers in We the People. Again, one
answer lies in the unwritten rule that a constitutional theory must address the
problem of totalitarianism. Ackerman's dualist constitutional system might not
prevent the rise of a totalitarian regime, but his prescriptive foundationalism
would. Accordingly, Ackerman rejects the dualist theory that is We the
People's major innovation. That Ely and Ackerman are willing to go to such
lengths to ensure that their visions of constitutional law preclude the rise of
totalitarian regimes suggests the extent to which antitotalitarianism continues
to influence academic constitutional theory.
The body of this Note has three parts. Part I describes the impact of
totalitarianism on the intellectual climate of America at midcentury, when
academics in many disciplines, including law, struggled with the implications
of Nazism and Soviet Communism for their ethical and epistemological
theories. Part II analyzes antitotalitarianism in the Supreme Court from World
War II through the 1960s, showing how the influence of anti-Nazism and anti-
Sovietism contributed to landmark decisions in many fields of constitutional
law. Part III explores the influence of antitotalitarianism on modern
constitutional scholarship, arguing that leading theorists like Ackerman and Ely
have been substantially influenced by the totalitarian problem. This Part
suggests that the major tensions in We the People and Democracy and
Distrust, two of the most important recent works of constitutional theory, are
traceable to the influence of antitotalitarianism.
25. See ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 6-7.
26. See id. at 320-21. For more on Ackerman's descriptive and prescriptive theories, see infra Section
III.A.
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I. Two THEMES IN THE INTELLECTUAL RESPONSE TO TOTALITARIANISM
The origins of antitotalitarianism lie in the decades before World War II,
when the rise of Nazism and a growing fear of the Soviet Union precipitated
a major crisis for English-speaking intellectuals."' Both regimes seemed
highly pernicious, and many Americans struggled to articulate a principled
opposition to Nazi and Soviet creeds. This Part discusses two separate and
sometimes contradictory themes in the intellectual response to totalitarianism.
One theme stressed the evil of relativism and the need for objective, universal
truths. If no truth were absolute, this argument went, then no firm foundation
existed from which to condemn and oppose Nazi or Soviet policies. Another
theme stressed the evil of dogmatic ideologies. According to that argument, the
essence of totalitarianism was unwavering adherence to alleged truths about
science, politics, or morality. Antitotalitarianism entailed the willingness to
doubt and revise one's own beliefs. The first mode of response urged
foundationalism; the second counseled skepticism. In the field of law, the first
theme was the more powerful. It helped chasten legal realism and positivism,
revive natural law theory, and invent the doctrine of universal human rights.
Its influence underlay landmarks of legal development like the Nuremberg
trials, the Hart-Fuller debate,28 and a long line of Supreme Court decisions
on civil liberties. The second theme, however, was also an important presence,
coloring the work of leading constitutional critics such as Alexander Bickel.
Together, these two ways of opposing totalitarianism redefined the project of
legal philosophy in the generation after World War II.
A. Dominant Theme: The Return of Normative Foundationalisin
1. The Quest for Objectivity
As Purcell has shown, most American intellectuals had by the early 1930s
rejected the idea that a normative theory could be logically conclusive." The
problem of totalitarianism, however, forced many to think again. Leading
academics began to argue that moral and epistemological skepticism were the
intellectual midwives of repulsive political orders. Bertrand Russell, for
example, linked the "pragmatist" theory of truth with Soviet show trials."'
The charge was fairly simple: Philosophical pragmatists like William James
and John Dewey denied that there was sense in a "correspondence theory of
truth," that is, a conception of truth as the unique representation of external
27. See PURCELL, supra note 4, at 123-78.
28. See infra Subsection I.A.2.c.
29. See PURCELL, supra note 4, at 72.
30. See BERTRAND RussELL, THE WILL To DOUBT I I (1958)
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reality.31 But if no single external reality regulated truth, who was to say that
the show trials were fraudulent? Defense against totalitarianism, Russell's
argument implied, required that truth be objective.
32
The call for objectivity reverberated through many intellectual disciplines.
American historians trivialized the relativist scholarship of the prewar
generation and strove to create a "consensus" that would be as "value-free" as
possible.3 3  Social scientists attacked Karl Mannheim's once-beloved
"sociology of knowledge," charging that Nazi ideologues had used that idea
to discredit liberal ideals as mere social constructions. The survival of
liberalism, they claimed, required that it be able to claim its own foundations
as objectively true.34 Karl Popper made a similar argument in The Poverty of
Historicism,35 a book that he described as his "war effort" and "a defence of
freedom against totalitarian and authoritarian ideas." 36 Truth, he insisted, was
lasting and universal, and historicism and relativism could undermine the
objective bases of freedom.37 Much of the broader public also absorbed the
idea that totalitarianism was bound up with the destruction of objective truth:
The popular literary image of totalitarianism was George Orwell's 1984, in
which the protagonist worked for a totalitarian government as a professional
falsifier of the past.38
The insistence on epistemological foundationalism and the possibility of
objectivity reached the legal academy as well. As an illustration of the shift in
attitudes, consider the fate of legal realism during and after World War II.
Central elements of realism included a skeptical critique of the claim that law
could be neutral and apolitical, and an equally skeptical view of the claim that
formal legal reasoning could discover justice or "humanitarian values."
39
31. See JOHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY 123 (enlarged ed., Beacon Press 1948)
(1920); WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM 91 (Bruce Kuklick ed., Hackett 1981) (1907).
32. See RUSSELL, sapra note 30, at 10-11.
33. See NOVICK, supra note 4, at 321. Leading examples of the consensus school include DANIEL J.
BOORSTIN, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1953), and LOUIS HARtZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN
AMERICA (1955).
34. See, e.g., ROBERT K. MERTON, Science and the Social Order, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE:
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 254, 260 & n.20 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973).
35. KARL R. POPPER, THE POVERTY OF HISTORICISM (1957).
36. NOVICK, supra note 4, at 298 (quoting KARL R. POPPER, Autobiography of Karl Popper, in TIlE
PHILOSOPHY OF KARL POPPER 2, 9 (Paul A. Schilpp ed., 1974)). Popper also applied those characterizations
to another book, see KARL R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (Princeton Univ. Press rev.
ed. 1950) (1945) [hereinafter POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY]. Unlike The Poverty of Historicism, which
typified the antirelativist strain of antitotalitarianism, The Open Society and Its Enemies exemplified
antitotalitarianism as skepticism and revisability. See infra text accompanying note 70. The Poverty of
Historicism was dedicated to "the countless men and women of all creeds or nations or races who fell
victims to the fascist and communist belief in Inexorable Laws of Historical Destiny." KARL R. POPPER,
THE POVERTY OF HISTORICISM (dedication) (2d ed. 1960). Similarly, Popper explained that he decided to
write The Open Society and Its Enemies in 1938, on the day that he heard the news of the Nazi takeover
of Austria. See id. at viii.
37. See NOVICK, supra note 4, at 298-99 (describing Popper's objectivism and its connection to his
understanding of freedom).
38. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
39. MORTON J. HORWiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 170 (1992).
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Prewar giants of American jurisprudence such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
and Roscoe Pound were confirmed realists. With the rise of Nazism, however,
many prominent realists changed their views. In the 1920s, Yale Law School
Dean Robert Hutchins had been a prominent realist. By the late 1930s, he
urged a return to foundationalism and universal morality. In denouncing ideas
that he had formerly endorsed, Hutchins made explicit reference to the rise of
Nazism. On the eve of the war, Hutchins bemoaned the skepticisms and
empiricisms that completed "'the journey from the man of good will to
Hitler,"'4 and in 1940, he attacked legal realism by declaring that ""[lhere
is little to choose between the doctrine I learned in an American law school
and that which Hitler proclaims.. ''4 At roughly the same time, the great
realist Karl Llewellyn abandoned several of his earlier positions, announcing
that any legal thinker must "need correction at once and, if need be, with a
club" if he forgot that "the goal of law is justice. "2
2. The Fall of Positivism
a. "Human Rights"
As Llewellyn's recantation implied, the decline in realist skepticism was
matched by a renewed interest in universal and foundational theories of justice.
Consider the Yale Law Journal as an illustrative example. In all of the 1930s,
the Yale Law Journal did not publish a single article on natural law or
universal rights.43 After the war, such articles began to appear regularly.*
These articles frequently contained prominent reference to the wartime
encounter with Nazism. 5 Indeed, reaction against Nazism gave birth to a
sweeping new doctrine of universal justice: the doctrine of "human rights."'
The idea of human rights is in some ways reminiscent of older theories of
rights, notably the eighteenth-century ideas of "natural rights" and the "rights
of man. 47 In other ways, however, it grows distinctively from anti-Nazism.
40. PURCELL supra note 4, at 152 (citations omitted). For another argument about rcalism as the road
to fascism, see Ben W. Palmer, Hobbes, Holmes, and Hitler, 31 J A.B.A. 569-73 (1945)
41. PURCELL, supra note 4. at 157-58 (citations omitted)
42. K.N. Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence. 40 COLt. ' L RE% 581, 603
(1940).
43. Roscoe Pound noted in 1942 that natural law thinking survived only in Scotland. ltals. and a tcy,
Catholic faculties. In Protestant and nonsectarian institutions in the Untied States, natural la.% %as dead
See Roscoe Pound, The Revival of Natural Law, 17 NOTRE DAME LAW 287. 287 (1942) It should also
be noted that the "natural law" in which Catholic Institutions maintained some slight intercst %%as often
Thomist rather than Lockean-liberal natural law; the latter was even more scarce
44. E.g., Edmond N. Cahn, Justice. Power and Law, 55 YALE LJ 336 (1946). M',res S McDougal
& Gertrude C.K. Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World Communir'. 59 YALE LJ 60 41949). Max
Radin, Natural Law and Natural Rights. 59 YALE L.J. 214 (1950)
45. E.g., Cahn, supra note 44. at 351-52; McDougal & Leighton. supra note 44, at 64. 68. 80
46. See, e.g., FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT. INTERNATIONAL HL.MA% RIGiTS 1-2 (1990.,
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War. Crimes of Peace. 4 UCLA WmOmEN'S LJ 59. 71-72 (1993)
47. See THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN (Henry Collin ed_. Penguin Books 1969) (1791)
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Its chief preoccupations are not with property or taxation but with
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and political views,
4
1
preoccupations that map the greatest evils of Nazism as Americans understood
them. Moreover, human rights doctrine has an international focus. It arose in
response to atrocities committed in foreign countries, and the theory and
practice of human rights retains an international orientation to this day. This
universalism has helped solve conceptual problems that Nazism posed for
Americans: A theory of universal, objective human rights provided a
framework for condemning the activities of a foreign state, regardless of the
content of its positive law.
49
b. Nuremberg
In the first years after the war, the event that best symbolized such a
condemnation was the trial of major German war criminals at Nuremberg. As
a symbol, Nuremberg represented the archetypal administration of justice in a
world beginning to use Nazism as its touchstone for unacceptable conduct. As
a legal event, Nuremberg elicited the attention of scholars concerned with the
possibility of nonpositive law.50  Several influential American jurists
participated personally in the trial, including Herbert Wechsler, Attorney
General Francis Biddle, and Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson. Through
them and others, the themes of Nuremberg became prominent in American
jurisprudence.5
48. See, e.g., Preface to ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 1993, at vii-viii
(Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993) (stating Amnesty Intemational's understanding of "human
rights").
49. The commitments to universalism and antipositivism implicit in "human rights" have been so
strong in the postwar era that the vocabulary of human rights has often overwhelmed and subsumed earlier
classifications of rights, as if "human rights" were not synonymous merely with "natural rights" but with
"rights" itself. In some cases, the unmodified term "rights" is used to mean "human rights," i.e., to refer
to the legitimate claims that all human beings have, irrespective of location or political conditions. See, e.g.,
Louis Henkin, Rights: Here and There, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1582, 1582 (1981). In other cases, rights that
had previously been designated "constitutional rights," "legal rights," or any of many other kinds of rights
have been subsumed under the heading of "human rights." In the 1950s, Harvard Law Professor Zechariah
Chafee published three books whose titles reflected the ascendancy of the "human rights" concept in legal
thought at that time. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., How HUMAN RIGHTS GOT INTO THE CONSTITUTION
(1952); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787 (1956) [hereinafter
CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS]; DOCUMENTS ON FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS (Zechariah Chafee, Jr.
ed., 1951). In those books, Chafee included as "human rights" several rights long present in American law
but not previously called "human rights," such as the right against bills of attainder and the right of
petition. See, e.g., CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 18, 90-161. The pattern persists: John Finnis.
for example, has identified property, contract, and assembly as "human rights." See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL
LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 221 (1980).
50, See, e.g., Sheldon Glueck, The Nuernberg Trial and Aggressive War, 59 HARV. L. REV. 396
(1946); Karl Jaspers, The Significance of the Nurnberg Trials for Germany and the World, 22 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 150 (William B. Ball trans., 1947); Harold Leventhal et al., The Nuernberg Verdict, 60 HARv. L.
REV. 857 (1947); Max Radin, War Crimes and the Crime of War, 21 VA. Q. REv. 497 (1945).
51. See, e.g., David Luban, The Legacies of Nuremberg, 54 SOC. RES. 779 (1987). The career of Edgar
Bodenheimer, longtime professor of law and sometime counsel for the federal government, furnishes an
excellent example of Nuremberg's influence. Bodenheimer served in the prosecutor's office at Nuremberg,
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The International Military Tribunal tried to limit the trial to issues of
positive law codified in treaties and international conventions of warfare.
Several contemporary commentators tried unsuccessfully to provide intellectual
support for that approach, arguing that the trial had conformed to the
requirements of normal positivist jurisprudence. One argument held that the
tribunal could not be accused of making new offenses and prosecuting people
for them, because the tribunal was bound by the charter that had constituted
it.52 Of course, the question of that charter's authority to create offenses
remained, because the charter was written by the Allies after the offenses had
been committed. A different set of arguments maintained that international law
was in an early stage of its development and that its courts were necessarily
lawmakers, just as early Roman courts or early English common law courts
had been.53 Those arguments, however, were not denials but justifications of
the trial's ex post facto nature. Another argument noted that the Allies had
announced their intention to try and punish war criminals, thus giving the
Germans adequate warning of the consequences of their actions." The
announcement of an intention to cause harm, however, does not differentiate
a legitimate warning from an illegitimate threat.55 In the end, none of these
arguments escapes Judith Shklar's conclusion that the trial really turned on
nonpositive theories of justice. 6 The propriety of Nuremberg rested on the
distinctly nonpositivist principle that some things were simply wrong, whether
codified or not, and that justice sometimes calls upon courts to act even when
they lack formal legal authorization.
c. The Hart-Fuller Debate
Anti-Nazism continued to chide legal positivism in the years after
Nuremberg. It was, for example, a significant influence in the great Hart-Fuller
debate over positivism and natural law, conducted in back-to-back essays in
and changes in his jurisprudential philosophy after that event illustrate the shift front pre% ar posttiism to
postwar foundationalism. In 1940, Bodenheimer dismissed the possibilit) of an eternal natural lass ot
reason, liberty, and equality, and he disapproved of encouraging judges to look beyond legal tet.ts to other
standards of justice. After the war, however, Bodenhcimer came to beee that certain practices serC unjust
and illegal under any circumstances, even when the written positive la%% stated other%%ase o'npar EDG kR
BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 174-80. 286 (1940). with EDGAR BODE,%IIEIIER. )t RISPR. Dt-%NCh THE
PHILOSOPHY AND METHOD OF THE LAw 296. 303 & nn.28-29 (1962)
52. See Leventhal et al., supra note 50. at 858-59.
53. See Glueck, supra note 50, at 416-18.
54. See id. at 440-42.
55. A thug who warns me that he will break my legs if I walk do%%n his street still acts illegitimately
when he acts in accordance with his warning. The difference between the thug's threat and a legitimate
warning is not a question of notice but of substantive justice, and the argument that Allied . arnings to the
Germans justified Nuremberg begs rather than answers the question of shether the Allies had the right to
issue such warnings in the first place.
56. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW. MORALS. AND POLMCAL TRtALS 146-90 (1986)
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the Harvard Law Review in 1958. 5' Although H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller
focused in their essays on their points of disagreement, they shared a powerful
assumption about the criteria by which their arguments would be judged. Hart
and Fuller both took as their point of departure the question of how legal
systems should deal with the problem of Nazism.58 At issue was whether
natural law or positivism was the proper approach to law in a post-Nazi world,
and which was more likely to cause Nazi-style calamities in the future.
Hart, making the positivist case, recognized that the weight of the Nazi
issue was mostly against him. His essay devoted considerable space to
engaging that challenge directly, but his argument actually conceded most of
the question. As part of his defense of positivism, Hart claimed that positive
law, though formally law, should not always be obeyed. Sometimes a law is
simply too unjust to command obedience. He portrayed his dispute with Fuller
on this point as simply being about whether such an unjust law is still worthy
of the title "law."59 Hart thus defended legal positivism after Nuremberg in
part by emptying it of its normative significance: A positivism that does not
counsel obedience to bad laws is barely worth debating.
A second part of Hart's defense of positivism was a historical claim.
Anticipating one of Fuller's attacks, Hart explicitly denied that German legal
positivism helped the Nazi regime to rise.6 On the contrary, Hart alleged that
Nazi jurisprudence had been insufficiently positivistic. 6' Arguing that judges
should sentence convicted defendants only in accordance with predetermined
rules rather than having discretion to shape sentences to individual cases, Hart
alleged that Nazi judges used an "intelligent and purposive" method of
sentencing.62 Hart did not explain why intelligent or purposive sentencing was
57. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958);
Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REv 630 (1958).
58. The same would be true of an exchange between Bruce Ackerman and Richard Posner a generation
later. See infra text accompanying notes 195-201.
59. See Hart, supra note 57, at 615-21.
60. See id. at 617-19.
61. This point has itself been thoroughly debated. According to Ingo MUller, Nazi legal doctrines were
"the exact opposite of legal positivism." INGO MOLLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE 220 (1991). Others have argued
that Nazi judges took liberties with pre-1933 laws but were strictly obedient positivists with Nazi-made
laws. See Arthur Kauffman, National Socialism and German Jurisprudence from 1933 to 1945, 9 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1629, 1645 (1988). In a slightly different vein, Judith Shklar has argued that German judges during
the Nazi era regularly perverted Weimar laws but sometimes used positivist theory to rationalize their
compliance with the Nazi regime. See SHKLAR, supra note 56, at 72. Finally, Marcus Dubber has observed
that the relationship between Nazi jurisprudence and positivism depends largely on which of two
understandings of "positivism" is in play. If "positivism" means "textualism," then positivism was indeed
the strongest force in German jurisprudence at the time of Nazism. See Marcus Dirk Dubber, Judicial
Positivism and Hitler's Injustice, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1807, 1820 (1993) (reviewing INGO MOLLER,
HITLER'S JUSTICE (1991)). If, however, positivism means "the separation of law from morality as politics,"
then Nazism was entirely antipositivist, because law, morality, and politics were all one in Nazi Germany.
Id. at 1822. Even on that last understanding, however, it would not necessarily be the case that German
judges had been antipositivist. It is also possible that judges who were not ideologically pro-Nazi could
have complied with an antipositivist regime for positivist reasons: A regime need not have a positivist
ideology for a judge to be able to make decisions simply by following its positive law.
62. See Hart, supra note 57, at 613-14.
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an evil. He seems to have assumed, perhaps correctly, that the simple fact of
association with Nazism would condemn the practice. He was, in short,
engaging in the pattern of argument that Leo Strauss once called the 'reductio
ad Hitlerum. 63
Fuller's essay gave even more space to Nazism than did Hart's, and, given
that Fuller was arguing the antipositivist position, this added emphasis should
come as no surprise.64 Because Nazi Germany could have existed under a
strictly positivist system, the Nazi example is usually invoked in support of the
antipositivist position (at least before audiences who take the undesirability of
Nazism as given). Fuller took up the connection between positivism and Nazi
Germany on the third page of his essay and kept the link in the foreground to
the very end.65 At one point, as if about to broaden his base of evidence, he
averred that "[ilt is not necessary ... to dwell on such moral upheavals as the
Nazi regime ' 66 in order to show the flaws in positivism, but he returned to
discussion of the Nazi regime only two pages later.67 Noting that positivism
had been a dominant theory among German legal scholars before 1933, Fuller
implied that positivism had assisted the Nazi rise to power.s6
The Hart-Fuller debate over positivism and natural law, then, was largely
a debate about which system was better suited to meet the challenges of
Nazism. Both Hart and Fuller believed that a demonstration that positivism in
fact led to Nazism would cripple positivism as a legal theory, which is why
Hart explicitly denied the connection and Fuller pressed his attack at exactly
that point. Conversely, Hart knew that he could support positivism if he could
portray the Nazi judges as people who reached outside established legal norms
and followed a private sense of justice. Hart's qualifications of his own
63. LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 42 (1950)
64. It is indicative of the postwar climate in legal theory that Fuller. v ho argued the natural lais
position, was a leading legal realist. Realism and positivism were not necessanl) aligned, so there ".s.a
nothing remarkable about a realist critiquing positivism. What was remarkable. hossecer. sas that i should
have chosen to make such a critique in the name of "natural la%%." a concept for sshich prcar realists
might have had little patience.
65. See Fuller, supra note 57, at 633.
66. Id. at 646.
67. See id. at 648.
68. See id. at 657--60. In an ironic twist near the end of his essaj. Fuller implied thai reaction agatist
the evils of Nazism was the primary motivation not for his ossn natural lavs position but for Haa's
positivism. See id. at 669-72. Nazism could easily make people afraid that the ideologies of a fess posserful
people will pervert the law, bringing injustice and destruction Denying judges the discretion to conv ict.
acquit, and sentence based on their own conceptions of justice is one possible protection against arbitrary
power acting under color of law. Fuller's contention here raises the possibility that one of the most
important and problematic features of postwar American constitutional philosophy-the concept of
"neutrality"-is traceable to the fear of totalitarianism. Indeed. the foremost spokesman for neutraht) in
constitutional law, Herbert Wechsler, explicitly acknowledged that his concern for neutrality had roots in
the confrontation with Nazism and specifically in his expenence at Nuremberg See Norman Silber &
Geoffrey Miller, Toward "'Neutral Principles" in tite Law Selections from tre Oral HJito"ur of lherbert
Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 854, 930 (1993). This variety of anti-Nazism is related to vshat I called the
"counterpoint theme" at the beginning of this Pan; rather than promoting foundationalisin as the antidote
to Nazism, it encourages skepticism of authoritatively imposed ideals Section I B. in/ru. eplores this
counterpoint theme in more detail.
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position suggest that the spirit of natural law prevailed in his debate with
Fuller: Both sides agreed that people must consult sources outside the positive
law when deciding what to do in a given circumstance, even when there is an
applicable positive law. That conclusion is unsurprising in a debate conducted
in an era of natural law revival, only twelve years after Nuremberg.
B. Counterpoint: Antitotalitarianism as Skepticism
1. Science and Ideology
As discussed throughout the previous Section, many American intellectuals
responded to totalitarianism by embracing foundational normative theories. But
antitotalitarianism took more than one form. According to other important
thinkers, the proper response to totalitarianism was not to espouse a
foundationalist ideology, but to be skeptical of ideologies in general. After all,
both Nazism and Communism were dogmatically ideological. Both were
hostile to the liberal, scientific values of inquiry and skepticism, refusing to
entertain the possibility that their dogmas might be in need of revision.69
These thinkers held that, to be meaningfully different from the totalitarians,
Americans should avoid falling into dogmas of their own.
Sometimes the same thinkers whose antirelativism supported the embrace
of foundationalism also produced scholarship that supported the anti-
ideological counterpoint. In the second of his two "war effort" books, Karl
Popper denounced the dangers inherent in ideological visions of politics. For
Popper and like-minded theorists, ideology began where science ended, and the
essence of science was falsifiability.7" Totalitarian thought was ideological
and beyond critique; democratic thought was scientific, that is, revisable and
falsifiable.72 In a similar vein, the consensus school historians of the 1950s
described the United States as a nonideological polity. Daniel Boorstin, for
example, wrote that America had no political ideology for home use or for
export, that the United States should not attempt to combat the Soviet Union
in an ideological war, and that sensible Americans had never been much
interested in the great European tradition of systematic political philosophy that
69. See DAVID A. HOLLINGER, SCIENCE, JEWS, AND SECULAR CULTURE: STUDIES IN MID-TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 160-61 (1996).
70. See POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY, supra note 36.
71. See NOVICK, supra note 4, at 299.
72. See HOLLINGER, supra note 69, at 158. William James and John Dewey, relativist villains
according to the foundationalist antitotalitarians, see supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text, were heroes
of the skeptical camp, see PAUL S. BUCK ET AL., GENERAL EDUCATION IN A FREE SOCIETY: REPORT OF
THE HARVARD COMMITTEE 47 (1945), because they urged incremental revision in systems of belief and
taught that abstract reason led to political absolutism. See DEWEY, supra note 31, at 96-97; JAMES, supra
note 31, at 33.
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had produced, among other theorists, protototalitarians like Rousseau and
Marx.73 For thinkers like these, the lesson of totalitarianism was the danger
of imposed ideology.
2. Alexander Bickel and the Problem of Ideological Jurisprudence
The skeptical, anti-ideological theme in postwar thought reached the
highest levels of constitutional theory in the work of Alexander Bickel. In his
early work, Bickel advocated a view of the Supreme Court as a political
prophet, leading public opinion in morally auspicious directions. " In his later
work, however, Bickel rejected the notion that the Court should act as an
ideological vanguard, and he criticized the Warren Court for trying to be
one. 5 According to Bickel, the dispositive force behind many of the Warren
Court's major decisions was the Court's faith in a particular vision of
egalitarianism. That, he said, was improper, because that kind of faith
"overrides standards of analytical reason and scientific inquiry as warrantors
of the validity of judgment."76 Scientific inquiry was appropriate for
decisionmaking in a democracy; ideological faith was not. Indeed, Bickel
praised his greatest judicial hero, Felix Frankfurter, as having been progressive,
democratic, and skeptical.77 According to Bickel, the Warren Court was
insufficiently skeptical of its own values. It would have been better served by
"adherence to the method of analytical reason, and a less confident reliance on
the intuitive judicial capacity to identify the course of progress. Pragmatic
skepticism is certainly an attitude of its Progressive realist progenitors that the
gallant Warren Court emulated all too little."'"
Bickel's anti-ideological stance, like Boorstin's, involved a general
denigration of systematic political philosophy. Quoting Madison. Bickel
disparaged "theoretic politicians" who aimed to remake society in conformance
with abstract ideas, and he charged that the Warren Court had succumbed to
73. See BOORSTIN, supra note 33, at 1--4; see also DANIEL BELL. THE E.ND O IDEULO.x O', 0. TE
EXHAUSTION OF POLITICAL IDEAS IN THE FIFTIES (1960).
74. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH THE SL PRIE COL RtT AT TiL B AR
OF POLITICS 239 (2d ed. 1962).
75. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 120-21 (1975) fhcreinatter BICKEL,
MORALITY OF CONSENT]; ALEXANDER M. BICKEL. THE SUPREME COURT AND TlE IDEA OF PROGRL .,
13-14 (1970) (hereinafter BICKEL, IDEA OF PROGRESS]. But see Anthony T. Kronman. Ale stnder Bickel
Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985) (arguing that Bickel's junspnsdencc was Ce.sntiall)
consistent throughout his career). The same skeptical theme is also present in the worl, of John Han El)
a generation later. See infra Section )lI.B.
76. BICKEL, IDEA OF PROGRESS, supra note 75. at 14.
77. See id. at 23. For a description of Bickel's relationship with and resecrnce for Frankfurter. see
Louis Henkin, Book Review, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1494. 1494 n.2. 1495-96 (1970) (reviewing ALEXANDER
M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970)).
78. BICKEL, IDEA OF PROGRESS, supra note 75, at 173-74: see also BICKEL- MORALITY OF COSENT.
supra note 75, at 120-21.
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that tendency.79 Even liberal ideology was dangerous, he believed, because
it had "pretensions to universality" and was therefore inclined to become
intolerant and oppressive.80 "Our problem," he wrote, "is the totalitarian
tendency of the democratic faith."'', Bickel criticized not democracy but
democratic faith, where faith is the unreasoned cousin of dogma and ideology.
Unreasoned liberalism, Bickel wrote, could bring about totalitarian
catastrophe. 82 Two hundred years earlier, ideological liberalism had brought
about the French Revolution, which, no matter what good it may have yielded,
was unmistakably "the first of the totalitarian movements to drench the
Western world in blood, particularly in our own century., 83 Avoidance of
totalitarianism required avoidance of "a politics of theory and ideology, of
abstract, absolute ideas," because such a politics "must proceed from one
bloodbath to another."84 In his last published pages, Bickel urged that we
''resist the seductive temptations of moral imperatives," because the price of
being too certain of our principles would be the "dictatorship of the self-
righteous.""8
The skeptical form of antitotalitarianism has not carried the argument
among legal theoreticians. Despite the great esteem in which Bickel was held,
no Bickelian school of professors or judges developed to advance or defend
his ideas.86 Instead, constitutional theory has moved in the very directions that
Bickel feared, including the direction of abstract and systematic theory.87
Although the skeptical reaction to totalitarianism has continued to play a role,
the form of antitotalitarianism that has dominated constitutional law and theory
is that of normative foundationalism, antipositivism, and human rights.88 As
Part II discusses, most of the antitotalitarianism that influenced postwar
Supreme Court jurisprudence was not skeptical but foundationalist.
79. See BICKEL, IDEA OF PROGRESS, supra note 75, at 166 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James
Madison)).
80. See BICKEL, MORALITY OF CONSENT, supra note 75, at 11.
81. Id. at 12.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 19.
85. Id. at 142.
86. See Kronman, supra note 75, at 1567-68; Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Alexander M Bickel and the
Post-Realist Constitution, II HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 521, 563 (1976).
87. See Kronman, supra note 75, at 1567-68.
88. The power of foundationalist antitotalitarianism was so great that not even Bickel himself could
consistently maintain the skeptical view. Even in The Morality of Consent, where his opposition to
ideological jurisprudence was at its height, revulsion at Nazi and Soviet atrocities limited Bickel's
skepticism. Bickel noted that the true liberal skeptic-his model was Holmes-would permit the public to
have its way in the end, no matter what substantive values the public chose. See BICKEL, MORALITY OF
CONSENT, supra note 75, at 72. Bickel was unwilling to accept that conclusion because recent experience
had shown that the public may sometimes choose "proletarian dictatorship, or segregation, or genocide."
Id. at 76. Bickel wrote that: "It amused Holmes to pretend that if his fellow citizens wanted to go to hell
in a basket he would help them." Id. at 77. Having lived through the 1940s, Bickel found the prospect less
amusing. "[Tjhis total relativism," he pronounced, "cannot be the theory of our Constitution." Id. at 77.
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II. ANTITOTALITARIANISM IN THE SUPREME COURT
By 1943, antitotalitarianism was a major force in Supreme Court decisions.
Both the foundationalist and the skeptical themes appeared in the opinions of
the Justices, sometimes complementing each other and sometimes working at
cross-purposes. Anti-Nazism and anti-Sovietism also appeared both separately
and together, sometimes in accord and sometimes in conflict. Moreover,
judicial antitotalitarianism was sometimes methodological, sometimes
substantive, and sometimes both. Substantively, the courts began to pay more
respect to the rights of the kinds of persons characteristically victimized by
totalitarian regimes, such as dissenters and members of racial minority groups.
Methodologically, American courts became more willing to look outside the
positive law, internalizing the antipositivism explicit in the human rights idea
and implicit in the Nuremberg trials. From the 1940s until the 1960s, in one
manifestation or another, antitotalitarianism played a major role in the
development of doctrine after doctrine.
This Part analyzes the paradigm shift that antitotalitarianism effected in the
Supreme Court, a shift parallel to the broader intellectual shift described in
Part I. It begins by examining three sets of cases in which anti-Nazism
contributed to the Court's reversing previously held positions regarding
religious dissent, racial discrimination, and executive power. It then examines
two sets of cases in which anti-Sovietism played a major role, first with regard
to the limits of police power and then with regard to the limits of free speech.
These sets of cases highlight what I have called "substantive"
antitotalitarianism, that is, antitotalitarianism as a major influence on the
substance of the Court's preferred result. This Part closes by highlighting two
landmark cases, Brown v. Board of Education" and Griswold v.
Connecticut,90 in which antitotalitarianism helped inspire not just a
substantive result but also a change in the methods of jurisprudence.
A. Anti-Nazism
1. Religious Dissent: The Flag Salute Cases
In 1940, a Pennsylvania public school expelled two students, William and
Lillian Gobitis, for refusing to salute the American flag and to recite the
Pledge of Allegiance. The Gobitis children were Jehovah's Witnesses, and they
considered saluting a flag to be a religiously prohibited form of idolatry.9
89. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
90. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
91. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586. 590 (1940).
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The Supreme Court found that the right of free exercise of religion under the
First Amendment did not protect the Gobitis children.92 Three years later, the
Court changed its mind. In West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette,93 a 1943 case that presented exactly the same circumstances as
Gobitis, the Court held that First Amendment rights prohibited the state from
compelling people to salute the flag and overruled Gobitis accordingly.94
The reversal was largely driven by the Court's desire to distinguish
America from wartime Germany. Laws compelling a salute to the national flag
called for conformity of belief and action, which by 1943 was closely
associated with the Nazi enemy. The association was especially strong because
the conformity demanded came at the expense of the religious beliefs of a
minority group. Indeed, a law demanding conformity of religious dissenters
offended both the foundationalist and the skeptical forms of antitotalitarianism,
the former because of the wrong done to a religious minority, and the latter
because the state was presuming to tell people what to believe. Voicing these
concerns in Barnette, Justice Jackson wrote:
Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end
thought essential to their time and country have been waged by many
good as well as by evil men .... Ultimate futility of such attempts to
compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort from the Roman
drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the
Inquisition, as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian
exiles as a means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of
our present totalitarian enemies. Those who begin coercive elimination
of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters.
95
Anti-Nazism contributed to the reversal in Barnette in a second way as
well. The salute that the West Virginia school required consisted not of placing
one's hand on one's heart, as in the salute familiar today, but rather of holding
one's right arm forward, stiff, and slightly raised. Writing as amici in the
92. See id. at 600.
93. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
94. See id. at 642.
95. Id. at 640-41. Jackson's jurisprudence frequently displayed several forms of the antitotalitarian
influence. In the lines quoted above, for example, the mention of Siberian exiles suggests a contrast with
Soviet as well as Nazi totalitarianism, even during the war. Moreover, Jackson's anti-Nazism was stronger
than the affirmative commitment to free expression that it supported in Barnette. In Kunz v. New York, 340
U.S. 290 (1951), he argued that New York should be allowed to deny a license to preach in public places
to a Baptist minister who preached that Jews "should have been burnt in the incinerators." Id. at 296
(Jackson, J., dissenting). He charged that the Court, in ruling for Kunz on free speech grounds, engaged
in "a quixotic tilt at windmills which belittles great principles of liberty." Id. at 295 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting). This willingness to limit the free speech of people who articulated creeds associated with
totalitarian regimes prefigured Jackson's Dennis opinion, written later in the same year. See Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); infra text accompanying notes 144-49; see
also Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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Barnette case, several community organizations announced that they
disapproved of the flag salute because it looked "too much like Hitler's."'
2. Race: The Japanese Internment
The dominant, human rights oriented reaction against Nazi racism was a
prominent undertone in the Court's attitude toward the wartime internment of
Japanese Americans. After the American entry into the war against Japan, the
military "excluded" most Japanese Americans from the West Coast, interning
those who lived there in military camps farther inland.9' Three cases alleging
violations of the rights of American citizens in connection with these
restrictions reached the Supreme Court. The development of the Court's
attitude toward the internment, as well as contemporary commentary on the
Court's decisions, shows the influence of anti-Nazism on American
conceptions of rights.
The first of the three cases, Hirabayashi v. United States," was decided
in 1943. Claiming that a curfew for Japanese Americans and an order to
register for forced relocation violated his rights as a citizen under the Fifth
Amendment, George Hirabayashi refused to comply and was prosecuted and
convicted for violating the curfew." The Supreme Court upheld the
conviction without dissent.'0 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Harlan
Stone wrote that the question to be decided was not whether the restrictions
were racially discriminatory, but merely whether there was a substantial basis
to conclude that the curfew was a legitimate military precaution.' Stone
explicitly stated that although "racial discriminations are in most circumstances
irrelevant and therefore prohibited," the government might "place citizens of
one ancestry in a different category from others" when doing so was "relevant
to measures for our national defense."'02 Racial discrimination was not
categorically unacceptable: The phrase "'irrelevant and therefore
prohibited"'10 3 implies that such discrimination could, if relevant in a
particular case, be legitimate. Furthermore, Stone held that the restrictions were
not subject to strict scrutiny just because they were racially discriminatory. A
96. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 627-28. The organizations included the PTA. the Bo) and Girl Scouts. and
the Red Cross. See id.
97. What was sanitarily called an "exclusion" involved the forced transport and incarccration of more
than 100,000 people. See JOHN V. DoWER. WAR WiTHOt.r MERCY RACE AD PO%%I:R i% 1nit, PwCIFI("
WAR 5 (1986).
98. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
99. See id. at 83.
100. See id. at 105.
101. See id. at 95.
102. Id. at 100.
103. Id. (emphasis added).
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finding of a rational basis for the classification, as the Court in fact found,
would be sufficient to uphold the curfew.' 4
The Court ruled unanimously, but at least one Justice had reservations.0 5
In a separate opinion, Justice Frank Murphy wrote that the exclusion policy
had a troublingly racist content. He noted that the policy "bears a melancholy
resemblance to the treatment accorded to members of the Jewish race in
Germany and in other parts of Europe."'" This explicit linkage between
Japanese American internment in the United States and Nazi treatment of Jews
would persist and grow stronger among opponents of the military policy.
A year and a half later, in Korematsu v. United States,107 the Court
upheld the conviction of an American citizen who had refused to report for
relocation to a military internment center."0 8 Three Justices dissented this
time, and their written opinions linked the case with Nazi policies. 1' 9 Justice
Roberts, for example, wrote that Korematsu had been convicted "for not
submitting to imprisonment in a concentration camp, based on his
ancestry.""'  Even the majority upholding the restrictions evinced more
discomfort than in Hirabayashi. Rejecting the Hirabayashi doctrine that racial
classifications in the name of national defense need only pass a "rational basis"
test to be upheld, Justice Black announced for the Court that "all legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect .... [C]ourts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny."'' . He went to great lengths to try to distinguish the internment
program from Nazi policies. Meeting Roberts's contention directly, Black
insisted that Korematsu was not about the "imprisonment of a citizen in a
concentration camp solely because of his ancestry .... Our task would be
simple, our duty clear, were this a case involving the imprisonment of a loyal
citizen in a concentration camp because of racial prejudice. '" 2 In a truly
incredible claim, he insisted that the internment had nothing to do with
"hostility to [Korematsu] or his race."'"l 3 These protests suggest that Black
wanted to deny the racist nature of the exclusion order, in contrast to the
104. See id. at 102. That Stone could apply a rational basis test this way five years after he wrote the
Court's decision in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), suggests that footnote
four of Carolene Products cannot by itself explain the Court's subsequent use of the strict scrutiny standard
to prohibit racially discriminatory laws. Only after reaction against Nazism brought a strong antiracist
agenda to the Court was racial discrimination afforded strict scrutiny. See infra note 208.
105. See J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., MR. JUSTICE MURPHY: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 301-09
(1968); PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 242-48 (1983) (describing Murphy's position in Hirabayashi).
106. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at Ill (Murphy, J., concurring).
107. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
108. See id. at 224.
109. See id. at 225 (Roberts, J., dissenting); id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting); id. at 242 (Jackson,
J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 226 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Ill. Id. at 216.
112. Id. at 223.
113. Id.
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Court's earlier willingness in Hirabayashi to accept racial discrimination when
rationally based. If the exclusion order were racially prejudicial, Black implied,
it could not be sustained. Something else was even worse in Black's mind than
racial prejudice: concentration camps. He went out of his way to engage in a
terminological dispute with the dissent, writing of the relocation centers that
"we deem it unjustifiable to call them concentration camps with all the ugly
connotations that term implies.""' 4 In light of these exchanges between the
majority opinion and the dissents, the case seems to have turned on two
questions of definition: whether the exclusion order was racially prejudicial and
whether the "relocation centers" were concentration camps. Racial prejudice
and concentration camps were the trademarks of Nazi Germany, and the
Japanese internment could not be upheld if it were of a kind with Nazism.
The final case in this series was E~x parte Mitsuye Endo,"5 decided in
December 1944. Claiming that she was a citizen detained without charge, Endo
had petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to secure her release from a
relocation center. The Supreme Court unanimously granted the writ. Writing
for the Court, Justice Douglas declared that the Court would not uphold the
detention of a loyal citizen simply because she was a member of a particular
racial group." 6 Some concurrences took even harder lines, denouncing the
entire evacuation policy as unjustified racism."7
These three cases show how the Court's attitude toward the internment of
Japanese Americans changed during the course of the war. The Court
unanimously upheld the internment in the first case, divided six to three in the
second case, and unanimously rejected the internment in the third. From
Hirabayashi to Korematsu and again from Koremarsu to Endo, the Court grew
progressively more sympathetic to the claims of members of a minority race
discriminated against by their government.
The taint of association with Nazi racism seems to have influenced
American attitudes toward the exclusion policy at the end of the war."' In
a fiercely critical denouncement of the exclusion policy, Yale professor Eugene
Rostow explicitly linked the American military policy toward Japanese
Americans with Nazi policy toward Jews." 9 Rostow charged what Justice
Black had specifically denied, that the relocation centers "were in fact
concentration camps."' 20 The military's claims about ingrained ethnic
114. Id.
115. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
116. See id. at 304.
117. See, e.g., id. at 307 (Murphy. J., concumng)
118. The shift probably cannot be explained by a waning of anti-Japanese sentiment as the '. at neared
a successful end, because anti-Japanese prejudice in America was at least as intense in the final stages of
the war as it had been in previous periods. See DOWER. supra note 97. at 51-55
119. See Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster. 54 YALE LJ 489. 506
(1945).
120. Id. at 502.
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tendencies toward disloyalty were virtually indistinguishable, Rostow wrote,
from "the pseudo-genetics of the Nazis."'' Describing the congressional
testimony of the military commander directly responsible for the internment,
Rostow quoted several passages that seemed parallel to Nazi statements about
Jews.1 22 On the last page of his article, Rostow drew a deeper parallel,
suggesting that Americans were publicly culpable for the Japanese internment
in the same way that "the German people bear a common political
responsibility for outrages secretly committed by the Gestapo and the SS. ''123
Most revealingly, Rostow closed by expressing his hope that the Court
would reconsider and repudiate Hirabayashi and Korematsu, explicitly
invoking Barnette's repudiation of Gobitis two years earlier. 24 This linkage
of the Japanese internment cases to the flag salute cases makes sense only as
a linkage of cases influenced by the confrontation with Nazi Germany. The
Supreme Court had overruled itself many times by 1945; it was not necessary
for Rostow to cite any particular example in order to urge a repudiation of
Hirabayashi and Korematsu. Had he wanted to cite a specific instance of
repudiation, it might have seemed more sensible to cite an example legally
parallel to those cases, one that involved Fifth Amendment rights or the right
of habeas corpus or rights against racial discrimination. Instead, he chose a
First Amendment case having nothing to do with race. What linked the
Japanese internment cases to the flag salute cases was not a specific legal
doctrine but the conceptual framework of antitotalitarianism.
3. Executive Power: The Steel Seizure Cases
Judicial reaction against totalitarianism was not confined to questions of
individual rights. It also informed the Court's treatment of structural issues.
For example, the link between totalitarianism and the concentration of
executive power was a powerful theme in the Steel Seizure Cases.'2 On
April 8, 1952, President Harry Truman seized steel mills across the country by
executive order. 126 His aim was to avert a nationwide strike that threatened
to stop all production of steel. Such a strike, Truman argued, would imperil
national security, because the production and maintenance of army equipment
during the Korean War required large quantities of steel. Truman
acknowledged that no constitutional or statutory provision explicitly authorized
him to seize private industries. He maintained, however, that he could
121. Id. at 506.
122. See id. at 531-32.
123. Id. at 533.
124. See id.
125. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
126. See Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1043.
[Vol. 106: 423
1996] Totalitarianism 443
legitimately seize the steel mills because the President had inherent power to
protect the country in emergencies.'2'
The Supreme Court disagreed and held the seizure unconstitutional.' 2 '
In a series of individual opinions, Justices Douglas, Frankfurter, and Jackson
expounded the dangers of concentrating authority in the Executive. In each
opinion, the specter of totalitarianism was prominent. The President had argued
that he could meet the steel crises faster and more efficiently than Congress
could; Douglas sardonically agreed, writing that "'all executive power-from
the reign of ancient kings to the rule of modem dictators-has the outward
appearance of efficiency."'2 9 Frankfurter wrote that -[t]he experience through
which the world has passed in our own day has made vivid" the dangers of
undivided authority, which even if initially benevolent was liable to lead
toward dictatorship.
30
Jackson's concurrence, perhaps the most influential of the Steel Seizure
opinions, was even more explicit. That executive power must be carefully
limited should be manifest, he wrote, "if we seek instruction ... from the
executive powers in those governments we disparagingly describe as
totalitarian."'' 3 The lesson of that "instruction," of course, is that executive
power must be closely checked, because unchecked executive power is a
hallmark of totalitarianism. Jackson also specifically aimed to refute the
government's claim that emergency situations give rise to special powers. The
experience of Nazism, he cautioned, showed the danger in the government's
argument:
Germany, after the First World War, framed the Weimar Constitution,
designed to secure her liberties in the Western tradition. However, the
President of the Republic, without concurrence of the Reichstag, was
empowered temporarily to suspend any or all individual rights if
public safety and order were seriously disturbed or endangered....
Hitler persuaded President Von Hindenberg to suspend all such rights,
and they were never 
restored.'
32
Seven years after Truman sent Jackson to Nuremberg, Jackson argued that the
lessons of totalitarianism required him to limit Truman's power.
127. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582.
128. See id. at 588-89.
129. Id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 593-94 (Frankfurter, J.. concumng). Frankfurter's reference to "the experience [ol our o%& n
day," sheds light on the Court's demurrer to the President's claim that similar seizures had been permitted
in earlier times. In earlier, pretotalitarian times, the concern with unchecked excut'c power had not
always been as great as it was in 1952.
131. Id. at 641 (Jackson. J.. concurrng).
132. Id. at 651 (Jackson. J., concurring).
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B. Anti-Sovietism
The Steel Seizure Cases produced an interplay between the anti-Nazi and
anti-Soviet forms of antitotalitarianism. Jackson articulated a specifically anti-
Nazi framework, but one might also detect a Soviet allusion in Frankfurter's
and Douglas's references to modem dictatorship. The most prominent dictator
in 1952 was, after all, the leader of the Soviet Union. In a different vein, the
tension between anti-Nazism and anti-Sovietism partly distinguished the
majority from the dissent: While Jackson cited the Nazi experience and voted
to limit executive power, Chief Justice Vinson cited the Soviet military threat
and sided with the President. 33 The antitotalitarianism that informed judicial
doctrine thus could frequently favor either result.
Which result a given kind of antitotalitarianism favored, however, was not
entirely arbitrary. The differences between the influences of Soviet and Nazi
totalitarianism on American legal attitudes largely correlated with differences
in how Americans understood those two political orders.' 34 For example,
anti-Nazism inspired a commitment to the rights of members of racial minority
groups, and anti-Sovietism inspired protections against police power. Anti-
Sovietism also had a more direct connection to free speech issues than anti-
Nazism, and at different times it supported different sides of the free speech
question. In the 1950s, Cold War security fears frequently translated anti-
Sovietism into suppression of dissent. 35 By the 1960s, however, anti-Soviet
sentiment regularly supported expanded rights of free expression, with the
Court portraying the United States as meaningfully different from, and better
than, the Soviet Union because of the rights that Americans possessed .
36
1. Police Procedures: Gideon and Escobedo
In Gideon v. Wainwright,137 the Supreme Court held that criminal
defendants have a fundamental right to legal counsel. 3 ' Gideon overruled
Betts v. Brady,139 which was decided in 1942, the year before antitotalitarian
133. See id. at 669 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
134. In other words, the intellectual merging of Nazism and Soviet Communism into "totalitarianism,"
see supra note 4, did not completely obscure the differences between those two regimes.
135. See infra Subsection II.B.2.
136. The turning point seems to have come in 1957. Until that date, the Court sustained many Cold
War measures designed to suppress political dissent. After that date, it tended to protect the free expression
of dissenters. See Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957) (reversing federal employee's dismissal for failure
to take loyalty oath); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (reversing Smith Act convictions of
Communist Party leaders); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (barring legislative
investigation into subversive activities); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (same); see also
HoRwITz, supra note 39, at 260; HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WoRTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN
AMERICA 211-26 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988).
137. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
138. See id. at 344.
139. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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sentiments began to inspire decisions like Barnette and Endo. Writing for a
unanimous Court in Gideon, Justice Black wrote that "the right of one charged
with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair
trials in some countries, but it is in ours."'"E One year later, in another right-
to-counsel case, the Court eliminated any uncertainty as to which countries
Black had meant by repeating the "us and them" motif and spelling out the
reference. In Escobedo v. Illinois, '4' which established the right of a
defendant to confer with counsel when being questioned by police, Justice
Arthur Goldberg cast the question in terms of the proper dynamics of a
confrontation between the police and the citizen accused: "Our Constitution,
unlike some others, strikes the balance in favor of the right of the
accused."' 4 2 He then included a footnote citing Nikita Khruschev's 1956
report to the Soviet Communist Party Congress, discussing confessions
obtained during Stalinist purges.' 43 By protecting the rights of criminal
defendants, Goldberg implied, the American system proved itself superior to
its Soviet counterpart.
2. Subversive Advocacy: Dennis
In Dennis v. United States,' the Supreme Court upheld the convictions
of Communist Party leaders who had been convicted of advocating the
overthrow of the government of the United States.' As a case in which the
right to free political speech clashed directly with the desire to block the rise
of communist power, Dennis provided a perfect forum for different versions
of antitotalitarianism to struggle with one another. Chief Justice Vinson skirted
the major issues in his short opinion for the Court, but the concurring and
dissenting opinions engaged in an extensive argument about the relationship
between communism and free speech in America. Justice Jackson, whose
antitotalitarianism had supported increased freedom for dissenters in Barnette,
now reached the opposite conclusion and concurred in the judgment. His major
argument was pragmatic. Implicitly acknowledging the tension with Barnette,
Jackson wrote that the problem in Dennis was not a "refusal of a handful of
school children to salute our flag."' 46 It was a well-organized, well-financed,
highly disciplined political organization and a serious threat to the American
order. 47 The Communists' superior organization and coordination made them
unlike the anarchist hotheads of thirty years before, for whom the "clear and
140. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
141. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
142. Id. at 488.
143. See id. at 489 n.ll.
144. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
145. See id. at 517.
146. Id. at 568 (Jackson. J.. concurring).
147. See id. at 567-70, 577 (Jackson, J.. concumng).
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present danger" test was an adequate limitation on free speech. 48 If things
progressed to the point where the Communists presented a clear and present
danger of harm or violence, all would already be lost. 49 According to
Jackson, preventing the evils of totalitarianism thus required limiting free
speech.
Justice Douglas took precisely the opposite view. In a dissent whose spirit
might have flowed directly from Jackson's Barnette opinion, Douglas argued
that America must tolerate dissent so as not to reproduce the evils of
communism, which demanded conformity. 5 He closed his opinion with a
virtually paradigmatic statement of that argument: "Vishinsky wrote in 1930
in The Law of the Soviet State, 'In our state, naturally, there is and can be no
place for freedom of speech, press, and so on for the foes of socialism.' Our
concern should be that we accept no such standard for the United States."''
A more clear statement of the antitotalitarian argument for free speech would
be difficult to compose.
52
At the same time, Douglas's argument in Dennis did not echo all of
Barnette's antitotalitarianism. In Barnette, Jackson had embraced both the
foundationalist and the skeptical themes of antitotalitarianism. On the one
hand, he defended dissent as a personal "right of self-determination,"
irrespective of the correctness of the dissenter's position;' 3 on the other, he
denounced the elevation of official beliefs to the status of dogma and
orthodoxy. 15  With the example of Christianity under Roman censorship, he
implicitly reminded his audience that beliefs that many Americans find
fundamentally good had been deemed abhorrent in earlier times.'55 Douglas,
in contrast, showed no trace of skepticism. He was entirely convinced that
communism was error. 15 6 The counterexample of totalitarianism was for him
a conclusive argument for the right of free speech, but only as a
148. Cf Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919) (announcing "clear and present danger"
test criticized by Jackson in Dennis).
149. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 567-70 (Jackson, J., concurring).
150. See id. at 591 (Douglas, J., concurring).
151. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting ANDREY Y. VISHINSKY, THE LAW OF THE SOVIET STATE
(1938)). Douglas consistently took this view of the relationship between totalitarianism and free speech.
Consider his statement of the anti-Soviet, pro-free speech position in Paris Adult Theatre, an obscenity case
arising more than twenty years after Dennis: "'Obscenity' at most is the expression of offensive ideas.
There are regimes in the world where ideas 'offensive' to the majority (or at least to those who control the
majority) are suppressed. There life proceeds at a monotonous pace. Most of us would find that world
offensive." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 71 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
152. A generation later, Douglas's position prevailed in the controversy over a proposed Nazi march
in Skokie, Illinois. The Skokie question was in some sense Dennis redux, pitting the antitotalitarian right
of free speech against the need to oppose actual advocates of a totalitarian regime. In upholding the right
of the Nazi Party to march, a three-judge panel made precisely the argument that Douglas had made in his
Dennis dissent, arguing that the right of free speech "distinguishes life in this country from life under the
Third Reich." Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1201 (7th Cir. 1978).
153. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943).
154. See id. at 637, 642.
155. See id. at 641.
156. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 588-89 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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foundationalist matter or, alternatively, as a way to distinguish America from
the Soviet Union. Douglas's antitotalitarianism did not include a willingness,
let alone an eagerness, to examine and revise his fundamental principles-or
at least not the principle of antitotalitarianism.
C. Antipositivism as Antitotalitarian Judicial Methuid
The foundationalist antitotalitarianism of Douglas and others eventually
helped to alter not only the substance but also the method of Supreme Court
jurisprudence. With positivism increasingly discredited by its association with
totalitarianism,'57 Justices became more willing to enforce conceptions of
justice that had not been formally codified.' The Court was particularly
inclined to prefer an uncodified notion of justice to the positive law in cases
where doing so would serve a central substantive tenet of antitotalitarianism,
such as racial nondiscrimination or the right of individuals to be free from
police repression. 159 Two leading examples, corresponding to those two
substantive concerns, were Brown v. Board of Educationt16 and Griswold v.
Connecticut.161
1. Brown v. Board of Education
Brown was an epochal case, and this Note cannot possibly explain or
explore it fully.162 This Subsection's purpose is limited to suggesting that the
foundationalist, human rights form of antitotalitarianism influenced the
jurisprudential method that one key Justice, Felix Frankfurter, employed in
157. For the contrasting view--that the problem of totalitananism makes positi'isnm more
defensible-see supra note 68.
158. Judicial willingness to impose nonlegislated pnnciples of justice gres% from antstotalitarianism
as foundationalism rather than as skepticism or revisability. According to skeptical thinkers like the later
Bickel, enforcing uncodified conceptions of justice was tantamount to imposing the ideolog) of a posserful
elite, and such an ideology was liable to be misguided. See supra notes 75-S5 and acconipan)mg tevt
159. Some civil rights leaders understood this pattern Consider a favorite slogan of Dr Martin Luther
King, Jr., which he used to attack racially discriminatory laws "Eser> thing that lIttler did in German) %%.Is
'legal,"' he said repeatedly. See, e.g., Interview with Playboy Martin burher King, Jr. in A TisT,, ,t NT
OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LLThiER KING. JR. 340. 356 (James .Ml in Washington
ed., 1986) [hereinafter ESSENTIAL WRITINGS]; Martin Luther King. Jr. Letter fruit B iiriunghan C'N Jail.
in ESSENTIAL WRITINGS, supra, at 289. 294-95: Martin Luther King. Jr. Loe. 1ts%, and CiI
Disobedience, Address Before the Fellowship of the Concerned (Nov 16. 1961). ESS WtAt r Rm'.os.
supra, at 43, 50. King's formula makes the postwar antipositivist case clean) and dir il) Positis ism and
Nazism were compatible, so justice is not necessarily coterminous with the posttse la%% Moreoser. Kings'
rhetoric involved the form and the substance of antitotalitananism simultaneous) In using a Nazi example
to discredit positivism and further racial equality, his attack united tuo aspects of the reaction to Nazism
160. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
161. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
162. Many have tried. See. e.g., RICHARD KLUGER. SIMPLE JUSTICE TItE l hSTORN OF Bro,', V
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976). Mark Tushnet & Kaiya
Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education. 91 COLt t L Rt', 1867 a1991 )
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Brown. Frankfurter is a particularly good Justice to examine for this purpose,
because he was generally hostile to the idea that judges should enforce their
own visions of justice. Frankfurter, it will be recalled, was Bickel's mentor and
was praised by Bickel for his skepticism.163 As a matter of jurisprudential
method, Frankfurter was extremely reluctant to rely upon nonlegislated
principles of justice. He had been on the Supreme Court for fifteen years
before Brown and had consistently deemed text, precedent, and history the only
legitimate means of deciding cases."6
When Brown came before the Court, Frankfurter directed Bickel, then his
law clerk, to research the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment to
determine its intended meaning. 65 Bickel later published the results of his
research and the rationale on which Frankfurter had decided for
desegregation. 66 According to the Bickel-Frankfurter analysis, nothing in the
text or the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment mandated the
desegregation of public schools. 67 The Fourteenth Amendment did, however,
contain language broad enough to allow some future generation to use it to
prohibit segregation. 68 No matter what the Reconstruction Congress might
have thought, the Fourteenth Amendment "left the way open to, in fact invited,
a decision based on the moral and material state of the nation in 1954, not
1866.,"169 The argument, in other words, was that the Court could find
against segregation in Brown even though the Constitution and its legislative
history were inconclusive on the point.
That argument contradicts Frankfurter's usual approach to jurisprudence.
Where the Constitution was inconclusive, Frankfurter generally located
discretion not in the courts but in the legislatures. Nevertheless, Frankfurter
decided in Brown to strike down racial segregation. He seems to have been
aware that he was deciding based on an abstract sense of justice and, in so
doing, violating his own ideals of judicial review. 70 His decision is thus
comprehensible as a convergence of methodological and substantive aspects of
the antitotalitarian influence. Even without the sanction of the positive law,
Frankfurter concluded, justice called on the Supreme Court to prohibit racial
segregation.
163. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
164. See Tushnet & Lezin, supra note 162, at 1872-73 (noting Frankfurter's reluctance on
jurisprudential grounds to reach result he favored merely on policy grounds).
165. See KLUGER, supra note 162, at 653.
166. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1955).
167. See id. at 56, 58, 64.
168. See id. at 63.
169. Id. at 65.
170. See HORwfrz, supra note 39, at 260 n.83 (describing Frankfurter's correspondence with Learned
Hand and Benjamin Cardozo about his inability to adhere in Brown to general policy of deference to
legislatures).
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2. Griswold v. Connecticut
The judicial methods inspired by foundationalist antitotalitarianism played
a still greater role in Griswold v. Connecticut.' At issue in Griswold was
whether a state could prohibit married people from using contraception. The
Supreme Court answered in the negative on the basis of a constitutional right
to privacy,172 a right that is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution.
Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas hinted that the necessary alternative to
a state that recognized a right to privacy was a Soviet-style police state. Early
in his opinion, Douglas discussed censorship and discrimination on the basis
of political views, 173  matters of questionable logical relevance to a
contraception case. In his conclusion, he raised the specter of a police force
that would monitor all aspects of citizens' lives, their bedrooms included, if the
law in Griswold were allowed to stand. 71 Censorship, discrimination on the
basis of political views, and constant police surveillance were all aspects of
Soviet totalitarianism, and that association helps to explain Douglas's linkage
of those three concepts in this opinion. 175
The Court relied on the ascendant antipositivism when establishing a
privacy right in Griswold. Noting that the Constitution guaranteed no right to
privacy as such, Douglas famously announced that constitutional rights had
"penumbras" and "emanations" within which the privacy right was
contained. 76 Locating individual rights in the penumbras and emanations of
positive law implies that nonpositive aspects of justice are as enforceable as
positive ones. As discussed above with reference to his Dennis dissent,
Douglas's antitotalitarianism was not skeptical but foundationalist.'
In the same foundationalist vein, Griswold involved a revival of the Ninth
Amendment,'78 whose statement that the rights of the people are not limited
to those explicitly stated in the Constitution had long been considered
toothless. On the theory that such a guarantee could be used to justify
anything, it was considered to justify nothing. 79 Indeed, as Justice Goldberg
noted, the Court had referred to that Amendment on only three previous
occasions.'80 In Griswold, however, Goldberg rested his finding of a privacy
171. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
172. See id. at 483.
173. See id. at 482-83.
174. See id. at 485.
175. It is also important to remember that Douglas wrote this opinion onl) one )car after the Court
employed allusive anti-Soviet rhetoric in Escobedo. See supra notcs 141-43 and accompan)ing tct
176. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
177. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
178. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487-99 (Goldberg, J.. concumng)
179. See ELY, supra note 17, at 34-40; BENNEr B. PArERSON. TiE FORGOrU-% NiNTHi A'dI 'ti 'i
(1955).
180. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 490 n.6 (Goldberg, J.. concumng) The three caes ere Uited Pubhic
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75. 94-95 (1947), Tennessee Electric Poier Co Tennessee Vlalle,
Authority, 306 U.S. 118, 143-44 (1939). and Ashiwander v. Tennessee Valle, Authorit. 297 U S 288.
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right on Ninth Amendment grounds, declaring explicitly that people have
certain judicially enforceable rights whether the law mentions those rights or
not. ' 8' In all, five Justices-Warren, Douglas, Clark, Brennan, and
Goldberg-invoked Ninth Amendment authority for their stance on the privacy
right.' 82 Thus, a majority of the Supreme Court believed that people had
certain rights not mentioned in the written law and, in contrast to the Court's
attitude for almost all of its history to that point, that those rights could be
enforced by the courts.
In one way or another, then, many of the decisions that revolutionized
constitutional law between the 1940s and the 1960s were significantly
influenced by antitotalitarianism. Sometimes, as in Barnette and Endo, the
Supreme Court reversed itself to avoid handing down decisions that seemed
consistent with Nazism or Soviet communism. Sometimes different forms of
antitotalitarianism clashed in the same case, as in the exchange between
Justices Jackson and Douglas in Dennis. Sometimes, as in Griswold,
antitotalitarianism contributed to the attitude that certain enforceable rights
supersede the written law. To be sure, antitotalitarianism was never the only
influence on judicial doctrine. But its importance should not be underestimated.
Antitotalitarianism in the Supreme Court helped to shift the central concerns
of judicial debate, just as antitotalitarianism among intellectuals more generally
had shifted the climate of debate in the academy.
III. ANTITOTALITARIANISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
The contemporary legal academy still operates within a theoretical
framework shaped by antitotalitarianism. To date, however, that influence has
been little explored. The leading study of antitotalitarianism among American
intellectuals, Purcell's The Crisis of Democratic Theory,183 ends with the
1960s, and there has been no systematic attempt to examine the effects of
totalitarianism on the thinkers of later decades. To begin to fill that gap, this
Part briefly considers Bruce Ackerman's We the People184 and John Hart
Ely's Democracy and Distrust,'1 5 two of the most important works of
constitutional theory since the 1960s. 86 That antitotalitarianism influences
330-31 (1936). It is noteworthy that none of these cases predates the rise of totalitarianism in Russia and
Germany and that in neither of the prewar cases was the Ninth Amendment given any weight. Only in the
Mitchell case, decided one year after Nuremberg, was the Ninth Amendment admitted to have any legal
force. See Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 94-95.
181. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
182. See id. at 484 (Douglas, J.. for the Court, joined by Clark, J.); id. at 499 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring, joined by Warren, C.J., and Brennan, J.).
183. PURCELL, supra note 4.
184. ACKERMAN, supra note 11.
185. ELY, supra note 17.
186. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation,
100 HARV. L. REv. 1189, 1217 (1987) (describing importance of Democracy and Distrust); Sanford
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those books should come as no surprise. Ackerman and Ely are, after all, heirs
to the intellectual traditions of Llewellyn, Fuller, Hart, and Bickel. Like their
predecessors, Ackerman and Ely operate within a conceptual framework
dedicated to addressing the problems of totalitarianism.
Given that context, discussions of Nazism and totalitarianism in works like
We the People and Democracy and Distrust emerge as more than isolated
references. They are manifestations of a standard theme in postwar legal
theory. Indeed, few things are more common in legal and moral debate than
hypothetical Nazi scenarios. Part of the explanation for that discursive pattern
is that invoking Nazism is a powerful rhetorical device. Many uses of the Nazi
trope are instrumental, reflecting someone's tactical belief that associating a
rival position with Nazism would be a strong attack against it. But the fact that
anti-Nazism is used rhetorically does not mean that anti-Nazism is not a
serious element of legal and moral theory. On the contrary, a successful
rhetorical device must capture some aspect of its audience's world-view. The
reductio ad Hitlerum has instrumental value only because Nazism is a
prominent negative reference point for postwar conceptions of justice. Nazi
examples, rhetorical and otherwise, occur frequently in postwar argument not
only because they are instrumentally valuable, but also because anti-Nazism
has played a large constitutive role in shaping the conversation. In other words,
much discussion of constitutional theory and individual rights after World War
II has been implicitly predicated on the questions of how best to distinguish
America from Nazi Germany and how to avoid the rise of a Nazi-style regime.
A. We the People
In We the People, Ackerman argues that the key to understanding
constitutional doctrine in the middle of the twentieth century lies in
recognizing the New Deal as a revolution that changed the rules of
constitutional interpretation.'87 To support that claim, he describes a process
of constitutional amendment which, he argues, has historically been legitimate
even though it does not abide by the formal amending procedures laid down
in Article V. The informal amending process Ackerman describes works as
follows: One of the "political" branches of the federal government has a new
vision of American politics that conflicts with the prevailing reading of the
Constitution. The actions it takes under this new vision are duly invalidated as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Then, in a series of elections where the
conflicting constitutional visions are clearly at issue, the innovating branch is
returned to power by the voters. The Court then understands that the people
Levinson, Accounting for Constitutional Change, 8 CoNsT, COMMENTARY 409. 429 t1991) (dcienbsng
importance of We the People).
187. See ACKERMAN, supra note II. at 131-62.
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have endorsed the new constitutional vision. As the people are the ultimate
source of authority, the Court is now obligated to construe the Constitution in
a way compatible with their will, that is, in a way compatible with the
innovations. 8 8 Armed with this understanding of constitutional amendment,
Ackerman argues that the New Deal worked a constitutional shift in much the
same way that Reconstruction and the Founding did."8 9 Since the late 1930s,
he concludes, a vision born of the New Deal-properly synthesized with
elements of the previous "revolutions"-has been the dominant and
legitimating force in constitutional law.'90
At the end of the book, however, Ackerman announces his dissatisfaction
with the amending process that he describes. He recommends that Americans
"entrench fundamental rights against constitutional revision" by declaring
certain constitutionally guaranteed rights to be unamendable, either by the
formal procedures of Article V or by the alternate process discussed
above.'9 ' To show that such entrenchment is plausible, he notes that "[iun the
aftermath of Hitler's defeat, the German people made it unconstitutional for
subsequent majorities to weaken their commitment to a host of fundamental
freedoms. The text's guarantees of basic human dignity were proclaimed
unamendable.'
'19
2
This proposal of unamendability is in tension with the book's basic point
about popular authority over the Constitution. The stronger the argument that
the people are the source of constitutional legitimacy, the more difficult it is
to argue that constitutional provisions should be entrenched and unrevisable.
In terms of the two themes discussed in Part I, the argument for informal
amendment pulls in the direction of skepticism, revisability, and suspicion of
188. See id. at 34-57.
189. See id. at 58.
190. See id. at 105-30. The focus of the present analysis is not a dispute with We The People over
the intellectual history of the Supreme Court but rather a consideration of antitotalitarianism's influence
on We The People. Nevertheless, it bears mentioning that the argument of this Note offers a different view
of the dominant influence on postwar judicial doctrine from the one that Ackerman presents. The New Deal
surely was a seminal influence, but it has difficulty accounting for several elements of modem Supreme
Court jurisprudence. For example, the judicial activism in the name of fundamental rights that marked the
Warren Court contrasts sharply with the New Deal Court's willingness to let the legislature eviscerate rights
once thought fundamental. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (sustaining
minimum wage law for women against challenge based on liberty of contract); Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502, 539 (1934) (sustaining state regulation of milk prices against challenge based on absolute
property right). Moreover, the central issues of the New Deal era involved property and contract, while
those of the 1950s and 1960s involved racial equality, privacy, police procedure, and free expression.
Ackerman is aware of these differences, and he does not argue that economics or judicial passivism per
se underlay decisions like Brown, Escobedo, and Griswold. He argues for a more complex causality:
Brown, he says, became possible when the intervening constitutional revolution of the New Deal diminished
the force of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), as legal precedent; Griswold became necessary as
a way to limit regulatory power after the repudiation of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See
ACKERMAN, supra note II, at 133-40. Perhaps Ackerman is correct about the relationship between those
cases and the New Deal. Nevertheless, as I argued in Part II, the influence of antitotalitarianism also helped
drive those decisions, perhaps in more straightforward ways.
191. ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 320-21.
192. Id. at 320.
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dogma; the argument for entrenchment resembles normative foundationalism.
Ackerman is aware of the tension between these two arguments, and he
addresses that tension by placing them in two different spheres. He
characterizes his theory of "dualist" popular sovereignty as an interpretive
account of how American constitutionalism has worked, not a prescriptive
argument for how things should be. His prescriptive argument recommends
entrenchment. 93 It would be difficult, however, to separate the two
arguments completely, because legitimacy is itself a normative concern.
Moreover, even if the arguments could be separated, the basic tension would
remain: If the people are sovereign over the Constitution, it is not clear how
the Constitution can be placed beyond the people's power.
In a critique of Ackerman's model of informal amendment, Richard Posner
presents a hypothetical situation that suggests the connection between
antitotalitarianism and the tension within We the People. "Suppose," Posner
writes, that "a Hitler-style demagogue is elected president and persuades
Congress to enact plainly unconstitutional statutes sweeping away basic civil
liberties."' 95 The courts "duly invalidate these statutes but the demagogue is
reelected anyway" in elections in which the invalidation of those statutes is
clearly at issue. 9 6 According to Posner, Ackerman would be committed by
his dualist theory to holding that the courts should then uphold the
demagogue's agenda, "even though it entailed their disregarding the written
Constitution, which had never been amended."' 97 It is to prevent such a
situation from arising that Ackerman recommends placing some constitutional
provisions beyond the reach of amendment. "[I]n short," Posner concludes,
Ackerman aims "to 'entrench' the Bill of Rights against a future Hitler."'"
Posner's assessment seems correct. Indeed, it does no more than accord with
Ackerman's own stated motive for entrenchment: We the People first
introduces the idea by saying that "it would be a good idea to entrench the Bill
of Rights against subsequent revision by some future American majority caught
up in some awful neo-Nazi paroxysm.'"'" Seen in that context, Ackerman's
use of the postwar German Constitution to demonstrate the possibility of
entrenchment emerges as more than an arbitrarily chosen example. It is a hint
at a specific influence shaping the call for entrenched rights: the problem of
Nazism.
193. See id. at 15-16.
194. Even an argument of second-order legitimacy, according to which shatevcr the people bclice
to be legitimate is legitimate, contains a normative component, because it takes a position on the source
of legitimate value, i.e., by locating it in the beliefs of the people.
195. Richard A. Posner, Democracy and Dualism. 56 TRANSMON 68. 72 (1992)
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. ACKERMAN, supra note II, at 16.
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The essence of Posner's critique of Ackerman's informal amending
procedure is that it would not prevent a Nazi regime from gaining power in
America. Ackerman, by making the prescriptive argument for entrenchment,
agrees that the critique has force. Neither theorist explains why the argument
from Nazism is a good test of a legal theory,"° but both accept that to show
that Nazis could come to power within a given legal order is to present a
compelling case against it. In using the problem of Nazism as an implicit
touchstone for legal theory, Ackerman and Posner follow in the tradition of
Fuller and Hart. Antitotalitarianism thus remains a powerful influence on
constitutional thought, and leading theories like Ackerman's operate within a
framework that it has helped to define.20'
B. Democracy and Distrust
Like Ackerman's We the People, Ely's Democracy and Distrust displays
internal tensions that suggest the continued relevance of antitotalitarianism.
Ely's major project is to advocate a process-based theory of judicial review.
For five of the book's six chapters, Ely argues that judges should use the
Constitution only to facilitate democratic representation and never to enforce
substantive value choices. He dismisses "'substantive due process,"' the
primary vehicle for value-laden judicial activism, as "a contradiction in
terms-sort of like 'green pastel redness. ' ,'202 Ely argues that the legislature,
not the judiciary, is the proper institution for ordering society according to
fundamental values. Judges, he says, should confine themselves to acting as
referees in the process of democratic representation, making sure that the
avenues of political change are open.20 3
Ely's argument for this procedural approach to constitutional interpretation
contains an antitotalitarian theme. Echoing Bickel's skepticism of judicial
prophecy, Ely writes that the alternative to constitutional proceduralism is the
imposition by an elite of values claimed to be those of the people. Ely calls
that "the Fifhrer principle. '2 04 He also notes that "'[t]he Soviet Definition'
of democracy ... involves the 'ancient error' of assuming that 'the wishes of
the people can be ascertained more accurately by some mysterious methods of
intuition open to an elite rather than by allowing people to discuss and vote
200. Posner has elsewhere explicitly refused to make such an argument. Having denounced the Nazis
as "monsters," RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 229 (1990), Posner notes: "I have
not thought it necessary to pause to explain why I called the Nazis 'monsters'; indeed the explanation
would have added nothing interesting to the bare statement." Id. at 237.
201. Posner, it should be noted, operates within the same framework. In his parting shot at Ackerman,
Posner calls the informal amendment model "[d]angerous because it invites judges to treat the popular will
as a form of higher law entitling them to disregard ordinary concepts of legality, That is what Hitler's
judges did." Posner, supra note 195, at 79. This argument is recognizably the reductio ad Hitlerum.
202. ELY, supra note 17, at 18.
203. See id. at 73-134.
204. Id. at 68.
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and decide freely. ' ' 20 5 Unless one is a judicial proceduralist, Ely implies, one
is akin to a Nazi or a Soviet.
Nevertheless, Democracy and Distrust exhibits a deep tension between its
major proceduralist thesis and another argument that appears toward the end
of the book. In his last chapter, Ely argues that special steps must be taken to
facilitate the representation of certain minority groups.2' He espouses
affirmative action .207 Relying heavily on footnote four of Carolene
Products,0 8 he argues that legislation intended to harm certain disadvantaged
and politically weak groups should be deemed unconstitutional. -'  According
to Ely, the rationale for this special attention to minority groups is the same
process-oriented rationale, the same commitment to democratic representation,
that motivates the rest of his theory.' 0 But that seems unlikely. In many
ways, the proceduralist thesis and the minority protection plan pull against
each other. For example, Ely's arguments for affirmative action may not be
consistent with his particular theory of democratic representation.' t ' More
generally, the entire concern with minorities seems distinctly substantive. - 2
It rests on policy decisions informed by values that, according to Ely's first
five chapters, should be left to legislatures.1 3 Having articulated a theory
that asks judges to avoid reading substantive policy choices into the
Constitution, Ely tries at the end to embed one set of such choices into his
own theory.
In the book's conclusion, Ely all but announces that what prompted him
to mitigate his pure proceduralism with an addendum about minorities was the
problem of totalitarianism. Quite explicitly, Ely sets out in his conclusion to
205. Id. (quoting H.B. MAYO, AN lN TRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC TtiEORY 217 (1960))
206. See id. at 135-79.
207. See id. at 170-72.
208. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Carotene Products was a prewar decision. but its fourth footnote
did not eclipse the rest of the opinion and gain force as a tool for the defense of minorities until seceral
years later. As discussed supra note 104 and accompanying text. Carotene Products author Harlan Fiskc
Stone was entirely willing to infringe on the rights of a discrete and insular minont) i c. Japanese
Americans) without a strict scrutiny showing five years after Carotene Products %as decided See also J M
Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 275 (1989) (arguing that Carolene's footnote four %as orginall)
only part of larger theory and lacked independent stature later conferred upon it)
209. See ELY, supra note 17, at 136-45. For commentary on Ely's treatment of C'urolene Product.
see Archibald Cox, Book Review, 94 HARV. L. REv. 700. 700 (1981) (resiscing J011% l-,RT ELN,
DEMOCRACY AND DiSTRUST (1980)); Tribe. supra note 24: Tushnet. supra note 24
210. See ELY, supra note 17, at 86-87.
211. Posner, for example, argues that affirmative action generally helps, members of iniont) groups
at the expense of "marginal" whites, that is, those who are themselves most unable to gain cffcctisc
representation in the political branches. Accordingly. affirmative action may actually redistibute rather than
redress the shortcomings of representative democracy. See Richard A. Posner. Democracs and Distrust
Revisited, 77 VA. L. REv. 641. 647 (1991). This argument is not necessanl, an argument against
affirmative action; it does, however, suggest that it is difficult to make an argument for affirmati.e action
on Ely's proceduralist grounds alone.
212. See Tribe, supra note 24, at 1075-76.
213. See Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of Process Theor, 77
VA. L. REV. 721, 735-41 (1991).
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defend his theory of judicial review against the charge that it could be
compatible with a repetition of the Holocaust:
It's not good enough to answer that the Holocaust couldn't happen
here. We can pray it couldn't, I believe it couldn't, but nonetheless we
should plan our institutions on the assumption that it could .... But
the reason the example cannot responsibly be dismissed [is] precisely
the reason it is covered by the constitutional theory of this book. A
regime this horrible is imaginable in a democracy only because it so
quintessentially involved the victimization of a discrete and insular
minority.
214
In other words, Ely believes that his process-based theory of judicial
review would be compatible with Nazism, and therefore unacceptable, were it
not supplemented by a special commitment to protect minority groups. To
solve that problem, Ely explains, he includes a minority protection principle
in his theory. It is, however, an inconvenient marriage. Like Ackerman's
proposal to entrench certain fundamental rights to prevent a Nazi regime, Ely's
desire to give minority groups special protections is in tension with claims that
most of his book is dedicated to defending. Ackerman solves that problem by
normatively rejecting his descriptive theory; Ely defends his theory against the
totalitarian threat by sacrificing its internal consistency. In both cases, a
commitment to opposing totalitarianism takes a leading theory of constitutional
law in directions where it might not otherwise have gone.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that American opposition to European totalitarianism,
Nazi and Soviet, has helped shape the most important constitutional theories
and doctrines of the postwar era. Indeed, much of postwar constitutional
thought could be described as a quest for a legal formula that would solve the
totalitarian problem. The consequences of antitotalitarianism have been
manifold: In many cases, different forms of antitotalitarianism recommend
different results. The cumulative force of its influences, however, has
substantially reshaped the project of constitutional law. On the level of abstract
constitutional thought, the need for a universal basis on which to condemn
foreign regimes inspired a resurgence of foundational theories of justice. A
skeptical counterpoint that balks at doctrinaire ideologies of any kind also finds
roots and support in the totalitarian problem. On the level of substantive
doctrine, reaction against Nazism and fear of Communism have helped make
racial equality, personal privacy, free expression, and protection against police
abuse into central commitments of constitutional law. The need to address the
214. ELY, supra note 17, at 181-82 (emphasis added).
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threat of totalitarianism has also influenced the most important contributions
to recent constitutional scholarship, as thinkers like Ackerman and Ely have
followed Fuller and Hart in making the problem of Nazism the final test of a
legal theory. In theory as well as practice, the specter of totalitarianism has
been the brooding omnipresence of modem constitutional law.
Antitotalitarianism has not, of course, been the only force shaping postwar
constitutional law. The New Deal, the postwar economic boom, the aspirations
of minority groups, and the traditional canons of constitutional interpretation
all affected the path of the law in the age of Brown and Griswold.
Nevertheless, the power of anti-Sovietism and anti-Nazism should not be
underestimated. Largely under those influences, the Supreme Court worked a
legal revolution that still dominates much of constitutional law. Forty-five
years after Dennis, constitutional theorists continue Jackson's "never-ending,
because never-successful, quest" for an antitotalitarian legal formula.' j  No
one has finished the work, and perhaps no one should be expected to do so.
But the most important postwar constitutional thinkers have not felt free to
abstain from it.
215. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 561 (1951) (Jackson. J concumng)
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